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ABSTRACT
This Article is the first ever to analyze a direct clash between the
inherent power of US courts regarding the enforcement of judgments
and the obligations of the United States as one of the 163 member
countries of the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, commonly
known as the “ICSID Convention.” The ICSID Convention includes a
self-enforcement mechanism whereby the courts of the member
countries are obligated to enforce the pecuniary obligations in multimillion (and sometimes over one billion) dollar ICSID arbitration
awards as though they were court judgments of the domestic courts of
that state, which includes domestic procedures for recognition and
enforcement of domestic court judgments. Neither Congress nor the
United States Supreme Court has addressed or resolved conflicts
between US domestic law regarding enforcing court judgments and US
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obligations under the ICSID treaty. A recent draft of the forthcoming
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
AND INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION also notes that no cases have yet
addressed this issue. However, this issue arose recently in the DC
District Court case, Hardy Exploration & Production (India) Inc v.
Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, 314
F.Supp.3d 95 (D.D.C. 2018). The appeal of the DC District Court
decision was withdrawn by the appellant before any briefs were filed
in the DC Circuit; thus, this still remains a lacuna in US law.
This Article invents and analyzes two hypothetical case studies
involving ICSID arbitration awards based on past cases in which a US
court applied domestic law or domestic public policy to an investment
treaty arbitration award enforced under the 1958 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly
known as the “New York Convention” with 159 member countries. This
Article guides US judges regarding the appropriate way to handle
investment arbitration awards by using two New York Convention
arbitral awards as examples. This Article provides guidance regarding
how US judges should handle those two awards had they instead been
rendered under the ICSID Convention instead, in light of the selfenforcement obligations described above. The theoretical exercise
presented in this Article provides future US courts with options to
balance their obligations under the ICSID treaty with their inherent
power over the enforcement of court judgments.
Keywords: treaties, restatement, international commercial
arbitration, procedure, enforcement, courts, judgments, international
arbitration, investment arbitration, investment treaty arbitration,
ICSID, New York Convention, comity, public policy, sovereign
immunity, and FSIA.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
The old adage, that “a hard case makes bad law,”1 rings especially
true in the realm of investment treaty arbitration, which is rife with hard
cases. Investment treaty arbitration can be defined in many ways, but
for the purpose of this Article, an investment treaty arbitration is an
international arbitration decided by a tribunal of private citizens (not
judges employed by the state) involving a national government as a
respondent (defendant) under either a contract relating to foreign direct
investment, or an international treaty (such as a free-trade agreement)
providing for international arbitration, or both.2 Much ink has been
spilled about the virtues and vices of the decision-making process of
investment arbitration tribunals.3 For the purposes of this Article, the
1. Cf. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400–01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of
their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate
interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem
doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend”); Winterbottom v.
Wright (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (K.B.) (J. Rolfe concurring) (“This is one of those
unfortunate cases in which. . . it is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a
remedy, but by that consideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard cases, it has been
observed, are apt to introduce bad law”).
2. See generally, Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s
Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 257 (2010);
Claudia Salomon et al., Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Primer, LATHAM & WATKINS (July
29, 2013), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-investment-treaty-arbitration-primer
[https://perma.cc/NC2P-LMT4].
3. For a discussion of some of the arguments in favor of investment arbitration, see
generally Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration A Threat or A Boon to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471 (2009); Stephan Schill, The
Virtues of Investor-State Arbitration, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
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Author will make the assumption that the decision-making process of
such investment arbitration tribunals is generally sound in order to
focus on the final stage of the process – what happens after the arbitral
award has been rendered.
To determine what happens after the arbitral award has been
rendered, it is first important to distinguish between three sources of
law that may apply to the arbitration award. First, the governing law is
the substantive law that the parties may choose to designate in their
contract; the arbitrators will apply this law to the merits of the parties’
dispute along with the lex mercatoria, which consists of global
business norms and practices.4 Second, the law applicable to the
arbitration proceedings is a combination of the arbitration law
designated by the parties (if any), the arbitration law of the legal seat
of arbitration, and the arbitral rules designated by the parties.5 Third,
virtues-of-investor-state-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/5YQT-5WNP]. For a discussion of some
of the arguments of against investment arbitration, see, e.g., Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet,
Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are Fueling an Investment
Arbitration
Boom,
CORPORATE
EUROPE
OBSERVATORY
(Nov.
2012),
https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7ZH-PH5F]; Chris Hamby, Secrets of a Global Super Court: A BuzzFeed
News Investigation, BUZZFEED.COM, https://www.buzzfeed.com/badge/globalsupercourt
[https://perma.cc/Z7P8-TMMJ] (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).
4. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMM. & INVESTMENT ARB., § 2.2,
cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. Nov. 2019 version of Proposed Final Draft), available at
https://www.ali.org/news/articles/restatement-us-law-international-commercial-andinvestorstate-arbitration-approved/ [https://perma.cc/L5P8-JZS4]. Within the broad framework
established by federal sources, both state law and foreign law nevertheless regularly perform a
central function in the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. Depending on the applicable
choice-of-law rules and rules of preemption, state law or foreign law may supply the rules of
decision—typically rules of contract law—on the basis of which the existence and validity of
arbitration agreements are determined. See the choice-of-law directives indicated in § 2.9(d) and
§§ 2.12 through 2.21. Those choice-of-law rules may lead a court to apply state law, foreign law,
or a rule derived from general principles of contract law (functioning as a species of federal
common law). The applicable law may also be found in an international treaty to which the
United States is a party, such as the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods
(1980)”) (italics and citations in original) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; International Court of
Arbitration, ICC Award in Case No. 2090 in 1976 (anonymized) (“…lex mercatoria, understood
as that body of international trade usages which inform the interpretation of international
commercial
contracts.”),
available
at
https://www.westlaw.com/Document/ICA01DB2B19814F4AB117F4D1D914E6FC/View/Full
Text.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 (Westlaw
sign-in required).
5. Cf. RESTATEMENT § 1.3, cmt. c (“[A]n arbitral proceeding is ordinarily governed by the
arbitration law of the jurisdiction in which it is seated. It would, for example, be subject to any
mandatory rules in the arbitration law of the seat. Similarly, the grounds for vacating or setting
aside the award would be those in the arbitration law of the seat”).
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the law of enforcement is the law that a court asked to confirm,
recognize, enforce, or execute the award will apply to make that
decision.6 The law of the court that may be asked to confirm, recognize,
enforce, or execute the arbitral award cannot be determined in advance
or included in the contract, because it depends on which party wins the
arbitration and where the losing party’s assets or property might be
located. In addition, there may be more than one enforcing court
involved if assets are located in multiple countries and, therefore, more
than one law of enforcement may apply. Finally, enforcing courts are
obligated not to rehash the merits of ICSID arbitration awards.7 This
Article addresses a problem involving the law of enforcement with
respect to enforcing ICSID arbitral awards in US courts. Arbitral
tribunals do not have the power to enforce their own awards.8 Instead,
there are two ways in which arbitral awards are effectuated. One is that
the parties voluntarily comply with the award. The other way is that the
winning party engages the machinery of a domestic court to enforce the
arbitrator’s award under the domestic laws in the place where that court
is located. While investment arbitration parties often voluntarily
comply with the arbitral award, it is sometimes necessary for one of the
parties to file an action with a court either to assist in enforcing the
award or to ask the court to vacate the award. Moreover, the US court
system is often the venue of choice for winning parties seeking to
6. Cf. RESTATEMENT § 4.1 (discussing the various convention-based and statutory sources
of law applicable to the enforcement of international arbitration awards under applicable
Conventions and the Federal Arbitration act in the United States); RESTATEMENT § 4.16, cmt. e.
(“The language of the Conventions makes clear that the content of public policy is determined
by the law of the jurisdiction where recognition or enforcement is sought”).
7. Cf. RESTATEMENT Ch. 5, Introductory Note; see RESTATEMENT § 1-1 Definitions, cmt.
r.3 (“Also central to the [ICSID] Convention regime is a relatively unqualified obligation
imposed on courts of contracting States to enforce awards; those courts are not entitled to decline
enforcement on public policy grounds, or on the other bases permitted, for example, under the
New York and Panama Conventions”).
8. See, e.g., Catherine A. Rogers, Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney
Regulation: Constructing an Enforcement Regime for International Arbitration, 39 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 1, 1 (2003) (“The continued success of the modern international arbitration system
depends on the willingness of nation-states to cede control over the substantive outcomes of
international economic disputes while lending their support to the enforcement of arbitral
agreements and awards”); Manuel A. Gómez, The Global Chase: Seeking the Recognition and
Enforcement of the Lago Agrio Judgment Outside of Ecuador, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 429,
429 (2013) (“A final [award] marks an important milestone in the lifecycle of a[n arbitration]
case, but it is by no means the end of the journey”).
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vindicate their rights under investment arbitration awards in part due to
US courts’ either enthusiastic or dogmatic pro-arbitration stance, which
developed over the past century under extraordinary yet deliberate
circumstances, the explanation of which is beyond the scope of the
Article.9 Furthermore, the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)—the arbitration institution that was
created pursuant to the ICSID Convention to administer Convention
disputes—is headquartered in the World Bank’s headquarters in
Washington, D.C., so the DC courts are often the “courts of first resort”
for parties seeking to enforce or vacate ICSID awards in the United
States.
Despite the pro-arbitration stance of US courts, confirming an
arbitration award in the United States is not easy per se. A winning
party must petition the court, and there are limited grounds upon which
a court can decline to confirm the award. However, the court’s answer
is normally affirmative, and the majority of arbitral awards are
confirmed in US courts, even if the award brings about a seemingly
harsh outcome. Because the default is “yes,” the hard cases addressed
in this Article are the cases wherein the court potentially has the power
to say “no” to confirming an arbitral award.
Most courts reviewing petitions to confirm international
arbitration awards apply a combination of domestic law and
international treaty law to the question of whether to confirm the award.
While the domestic law may vary from country to country, most
countries have some form of domestic arbitration statute or a specific
statute that relates directly to international arbitration. In the United
States, there is more than one domestic statute that could apply. The
most famous arbitration statute in the United States is the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), passed by Congress in 1925.10 Chapter 1 of
the FAA regulates domestic arbitration awards in the United States.11
This statute also incorporates by reference two treaties to which the
United States is a party. The first treaty is the 1958 United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
9. For a history of arbitration law in the United States as far back as the 1925 Federal
Arbitration Act, see generally Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining
the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002);
Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of History, 2016
J. DISP. RESOL. 115 (2016).
10. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2018).
11. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2018).
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Awards, commonly known as the “New York Convention,” which
enables a party to give effect to an arbitration award in 159 member
states and quasi-state regions and is incorporated by reference into
Chapter 2 of the FAA.12 The second treaty is the 1975 Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, commonly
known as the “Panama Convention”, which enables a party to give
effect to an international commercial arbitration award in 19 countries
in the Americas and is incorporated by reference in to Chapter 3 of the
FAA.13 As its name suggests, the Panama Convention is not typically
used to enforce investment arbitration awards.14 Thus, the remainder of
this Article focuses primarily on the New York Convention and one
other treaty that is not referenced in the FAA, which is the ICSID
Convention.
The United States is one of the 163 member states and quasi-state
regions that are parties to the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States,
commonly known as the “ICSID Convention.”15 The ICSID
Convention, discussed in greater detail in Part II of this Article, allows
corporations or individuals to sue a member state for redress of
grievances that infringe upon their rights as “investors” within the
12. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2018). The term member state is used throughout this Article
for clarity and brevity to encompass both recognized states and non-state or quasi-state regions
that are members of the Convention. Examples of non-state or quasi-state regions that are
members of the Convention include Palestine, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
13. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (2018).
14. If an investment arbitration award is rendered pursuant to a contract, and all the parties
are nationals or governments of the states that are parties to the Panama Convention, then it may
perhaps be possible to enforce an investment arbitration under the Panama Convention, but only
if the contract involved a commercial transaction within the meaning of art. 1 of the Convention.
A discussion of whether an investment contract is a commercial transaction that falls within the
scope of the Panama Convention is beyond the scope of this Article.
15. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 54, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention]; List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as of April 12,
2019)
ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/List%20of%20Contracting%20States%20
and%20Other%20Signatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20Latest.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PNV9-THA8] (last visited Nov. 13, 2019). The term member state is used
throughout this Article for clarity and brevity to encompass both recognized states and non-state
or quasi-state regions that are members of the Convention. Examples of non-state or quasi-state
regions that are members of the Convention include Palestine, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
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meaning of the investment treaties and free trade agreements that
provide for international arbitration as the dispute resolution
mechanism. The ICSID Convention includes a self-enforcement
mechanism whereby the courts of the member countries are obligated
to enforce the arbitration awards rendered by the arbitrators as if they
were court judgments of the domestic courts of that state. This is
completely separate and independent from the domestic system of law
and courts in these countries, except with regard to the procedure for
enforcing arbitral awards rendered under the treaty. The treaty provides
that the member countries shall treat the pecuniary obligations in the
arbitral award as if they were a final judgment of a court in that state.16
This means that courts in the member countries can apply domestic
procedures for recognition and enforcement of domestic court awards
to the recognition and enforcement of the ICSID arbitral award.
The self-enforcement mechanism also means that the ICSID
treaty was designed such that the courts of the member states would
merely verify the veracity of the award and then enforce it as if it were
a court judgement, without inquiring into the underlying merits of the
case. Conflicts between US domestic law regarding enforcing court
judgments and US obligations under the ICSID treaty have not yet been
tested in actions to enforce ICSID arbitration awards in US courts.
Recently, however, courts in the United States have inquired into the
merits of non-ICSID investment arbitration awards when determining
whether to enforce them, for example, because the awards violated
domestic procedural or public policy norms, or because the court
determined that the remedy in the award infringed upon the sovereignty
of a foreign state.17 Because the United States is a favored jurisdiction
for the enforcement of international arbitration awards due to the
independence of its judicial system, it is only a matter of time before
these same types of issues will arise in the context of enforcing an
ICSID arbitration award, which would lead to a direct clash between
the obligations of the United States under the ICSID treaty and the
inherent power of the US court system regarding the enforcement of
judgments.
Since this issue has not yet been tested in US courts, this Article
conducts a case study by analyzing two recent cases in which a US
court applied domestic law or domestic public policy to an investment
treaty arbitration award enforced under the New York Convention
16. Id. art. 54.
17. Id. art. 55.
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(arguably the most successful international arbitration award
enforcement convention with 159 parties) at the post-award phase and
offers theories about how US courts would handle the same awards in
those two cases had they instead been rendered under the ICSID
Convention, in light of the self-enforcement obligations described
above. The first case, BG Group v. Argentina, involved the US
Supreme Court applying domestic arbitration law and the common law
of contract principles to enforce an investment arbitration award under
the New York Convention.18 The second case, Hardy Exploration v.
India, involved the DC District Court applying the doctrines of public
policy, comity, sovereign deference, and a version of the “Golden
Rule” to decline enforcement of an investment arbitration award under
the New York Convention.19 This Article offers theories about how US
courts would handle the same awards discussed in the case studies had
they instead been rendered under the ICSID Convention, in light of the
self-enforcement obligations described above. The theoretical exercise
presented in this Article is intended to provide future US courts with
options to balance their obligations under the ICSID treaty with their
inherent power over the enforcement of court judgments.
In addition to the aforementioned complexities, the Reader should
also note the potential for confusion regarding terminology; hence, this
Article introduces additional working definitions at this stage. The
terms “confirm” or “recognize” mean to deem the arbitral award valid
and to provide a judicial “stamp of approval” for the arbitral award.20
Similarly, “confirmation” and “recognition” are the corresponding
noun forms.21 Moreover, in domestic US litigation, the terms “enforce”

18. See generally BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 572 U.S. 25 (2014).
19. See generally Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India) Inc. v. Gov’t of India, Ministry of Petroleum
& Nat. Gas, 314 F.Supp.3d 95 (D.D.C. 2018). The appeal of the DC District Court decision was
withdrawn before any briefs were filed in the DC Circuit.
20. Confirm, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“1. To give formal approval
to . . . . 2. To verify or corroborate. . . . 3. To make firm or certain . . . .”); Recognition, id. (“1.
Confirmation that an act done by another person was authorized. See RATIFICATION. 2. The
formal admission that a person, entity, or thing has a particular status; esp., a country’s act in
formally acknowledging the existence of another country or national government.”)
(capitalization in original).
21. Id.
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and “execute” are used interchangeably.22 In contrast, “enforce” in the
international context means for a court to convert an arbitral award into
a judgment of that court.23 “Enforcement” (i.e. the noun form) is a
required step before an arbitral award can be “executed.” Congress and
US courts sometimes seem to confuse the above three terms and use
them interchangeably.24 This confusion is one of the sources of the
“bad law” problem referenced earlier in this Introduction.25
“Execution” has the same meaning that it has in the context of domestic
court judgments, that is to use the police power of the government in
which the executing court sits in order to seize and sell assets to pay
the monetary portion of the judgment or award.26 Similarly, the terms
“vacate,” “set aside” and “annul” mean to overturn or invalidate an
arbitral award, which is essentially equivalent to how these words are
used in the domestic US litigation context.27
With those definitions in mind, this Article proceeds as follows.
Part II explains how investment arbitration awards are enforced under
US domestic law. Part III presents two case studies involving
investment treaty arbitration awards enforced under the New York
Convention and analyzes how the court might have handled the case
differently had these been ICSID Convention arbitration awards
22. Compare Enforce, id. (“1. To give force or effect to (a law, etc.); to compel obedience
to. 2. Loosely, to compel a person to pay damages for not complying with (a contract).”), with
Execute, id. (“3. To make (a legal document) valid by signing; to bring (a legal document) into
its final, legally enforceable form . . . . 5. To enforce and collect on (a money judgment) . . . .”)
(parentheses in original).
23. See, e.g., John McDermott, The Survey of Methods for the Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments and Foreign Arbitral Awards in the Asia-Pacific Region, 12 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 114, 115 (1989) (“The basis for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments under the common law is the doctrine of obligation, whereby the foreign judgment is
treated as an implied promise to pay the amount of the judgment. To enforce the foreign
judgment, a suit is brought on the foreign judgment in order to obtain a domestic judgment in
the same amount.”) (italics in original).
24. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1650A (2018); Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India) Inc v. Gov’t of India,
Ministry of Petroleum & Nat. Gas, 314 F.Supp.3d 95 (D.D.C. 2018). Both the statute and the
Hardy case are discussed later in this Article.
25. See supra note 1.
26. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 3202(e) (1990) (“Sale of Property.—The property of a judgment
debtor which is subject to sale to satisfy the judgment may be sold by judicial sale, pursuant to
sections 2001, 2002, and 2004 or by execution sale pursuant to section 3203(g). If a hearing is
requested pursuant to subsection (d), property with respect to which the request relates shall not
be sold before such hearing.”) (emphasis added).
27. Cf. Vacate, supra note 20 (1. To nullify or cancel; make void; invalidate . . . .”) with
Set Aside, id. (“(Of a court) to annul or vacate (a judgment, order, etc.)”) (parentheses in
original).
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instead. The case study of BG Group v. Argentina addresses the
application of domestic arbitration law and the common law of contract
principles to enforce a non-ICSID investment arbitration award.28 The
case study of Hardy Exploration v. India addresses the application of
the doctrines of public policy, comity, sovereign deference, and a
version of the “Golden Rule,”29 to decline enforcement of a non-ICSID
investment arbitration award.30 Part III also discusses the implications
of the results of the two case studies and the hypothetical scenarios.
Part IV concludes.
II. ENFORCING INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER
US DOMESTIC LAW
The ICSID Convention is a treaty that was originally signed in
1965 and went into force in 1966.31 Over 3500 separate investment
treaties now exist worldwide,32 many of which allow for investors to
choose the ICSID Convention’s system of international arbitration by
which to bring a claim against an ICSID member state. There are 163
ICSID member states at the time of this writing and the number is still

28. See generally BG Grp. PLC, 572 U.S. 25 (2014).
29. See Golden Rule, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (online), available at
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/golden%20rule [https://perma.cc/G38A-RABW]
(“a rule of ethical conduct referring to Matthew 7:12 [in The Bible] and Luke 6:31 [in The
Bible]: do to others as you would have them do to you”).
30. See Hardy Expl., 314 F.Supp.3d. 95, 114 (“Third, while the doctrine of international
comity does not generally counsel against the confirmation of arbitral awards, as India has
indicated [in its written brief], confirmation of this award would ‘raise the specter of the opposite
situation coming to pass; namely, a foreign court confirming (or the court going further and
granting injunctive relief directly) against the United States for acts it has taken within its own
borders or respecting its own territory.’ Given that the United States has not waived its sovereign
immunity in its own courts against specific performance in contract cases, it would defy
comprehension that it would be in compliance with US public policy to create a situation in
which a foreign court could order the US to specifically perform its portion of a contract.”)
(internal citations omitted) (parentheses in original).
31. See generally ICSID Convention, supra note 12.
32. See e.g., Emma Lindsay & LaDawn Burnett, International Investment Arbitration in
Africa:
Year
in
Review
2016,
BRYAN
CAVE,
https://www.bryancave.com/images/content/9/3/v2/93577/International-InvestmentArbitration-YiR-Africa-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VLU-X4UU] (last visited Nov. 13, 2019)
(survey of investment treaties mentioning that around 3,500 such treaties existed worldwide in
2016).
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growing gradually.33 For example, Mexico signed onto the ICSID
Convention in 2018, Iraq in 2015, and Canada in 2013, among other
new signatories in recent years.34 Traditionally, states have ratified the
ICSID Convention as well as other bilateral and multilateral investment
treaties in order to attract foreign direct investment into their territories
from foreign corporations and individuals.35 Those foreign
corporations and individuals are always claimants in the investment
arbitration system, vindicating their rights as set forth in the investment
treaties and free trade agreements.36 Correspondingly, the member
states are always respondents in ICSID arbitrations, and they rarely
have been able successfully to bring counterclaims against investors,
in part due to jurisdictional constraints present in the corresponding
investment treaties, which some have argued is a flaw in the system.37
Thus, enforcing an ICSID award usually means a traditional court
ordering a foreign sovereign member state to comply with the award—
an exertion of judicial power that, in the United states, invokes the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). 38The FSIA exempts
foreign governments from suit against them unless one of a list of
exceptions applies.39 The FSIA specifically includes an exception to
sovereign immunity in situations where the foreign sovereign has
waived sovereign immunity to participate in arbitration proceedings
and, correspondingly, to enforce the resulting arbitration award.40 It is
settled law in the United States that arbitration proceedings under the
ICSID Convention and the resulting arbitration awards meet the
requirements of the exception in the FSIA.41 Thus, US courts clearly
33. See List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as of April 12,
2019), supra note 15.
34. Id.
35. See generally, FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND
COMMENTARY 1-20 (W. Michael Reisman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014) (explaining the history of the
foreign direct investment, foreign investment disputes, investment treaties, and international
arbitration under investment treaties).
36. Cf. ICSID Convention, supra note 12, at art. 25.
37. For the key arguments criticizing the jurisdictional structure of the investment treaty
arbitration system, see, e.g., Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, supra note 3; Gustavo Laborde, The
Case for Host State Claims in Investment Arbitration, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 97–122
(2010).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2018).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2018) (stating that a foreign sovereign is immune from suit
unless one of the enumerated exceptions in this section applies).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2018).
41. Cf. Micula v. Government of Romania, 2015 WL 4643180, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“As
fully discussed in Mobil, given the spirit of the ICSID Convention [to which the United States
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have the power to enforce ICSID arbitration awards against foreign
sovereigns. How then do US courts accomplish this enforcement
against their fellow member states?
The unique innovation of the ICSID system is that member states
are obligated to enforce the ICSID award immediately upon
presentation of a certified copy of the arbitration award to one of the
member state’s local courts or to some other governmental body vested
with the authority to enforce the award.42 A member state cannot refuse
to recognize an ICSID award.43 With respect to enforcement, the
member States cannot refuse to enforce the monetary obligations in the
ICSID award.44 In addition, a US court cannot use the forum non
conveniens doctrine to decline enforcement of an ICSID award.45 The
distinction between recognition and enforcement of an arbitration
award is fraught, but for the purposes of this Article, the terms will be
treated as interchangeable in accordance with US domestic law.46
Execution, however, is a distinct term.47
is a party], the language of its enabling statute, the clear exceptions to the FSIA that apply and
precedent in this District, the expensive and time-consuming process of a plenary proceeding to
recognize an ICSID award in the United States is unnecessary as a matter of law.”) (emphasis
added).
42. See Abby Cohen Smutny et al., Enforcement of ICSID Convention Arbitral Awards in
U.S. Courts, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 649, 656 (2016).
43. Id. at 653.
44. Id. at 653–54.
45. See RESTATEMENT § 5-6(a)(4) (“Actions to enforce an ICSID Convention award are
not subject to stay or dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds”).
46. See, e.g., Smutny et al., supra note 42, at 658 (“Commentators have observed,
however, that in some instances the term recognition is equated with enforcement, while in other
instances enforcement has been equated to execution. Some commenters suggest that because
authentic French and Spanish texts of the ICSID Convention use the same word for both
‘enforcement’ and ‘execution,’ the words should be interpreted to have the same meaning in the
English text of Article 54 —although whether that meaning refers to execution or ‘a broad
concept embracing all steps covered by Art[icle] 54’ might not be clear”). RESTATEMENT § 5-5,
cmt. b.iii (“Enforcement or recognition of awards must be distinguished from execution. As far
as execution of ICSID Convention awards is concerned, i.e., the actual taking of possession of
the property of the losing party, Article 54(3) of the Convention expressly provides that
‘[e]xecution of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution of judgments
in force in the State in whose territories such execution is sought’”) (parentheses, quotations,
and brackets in original); 22 U.S.C. § 1650A (2018) (implementing the ICSID Convention and
using only the word “enforcement”).
47. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT § 5-5, cmt. b.iii (“Enforcement or recognition of awards must
be distinguished from execution. As far as execution of ICSID Convention awards is concerned,
i.e., the actual taking of possession of the property of the losing party, Article 54(3) of the

14

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:1

The ICSID Convention also allows member states with a federal
structure to treat the ICSID award as if it were a final judgment of one
of the individual states within the federal system.48 At the request of
the United States, language was included in the Convention to allow
member states to impose their individual domestic requirements for the
recognition and enforcement of final judgments upon the ICSID
award.49 The United States likely requested this provision because of
its dual federal and state court systems and the existing practice in the
United States of arbitration awards enforcement in both systems
according to the FAA.50 It is crucial to note, however, that Congress
specifically exempted ICSID awards from the application of
the FAA.51
In fact, one additional helpful way to understand the ICSID
Convention is to understand it according to what it is not. As mentioned
above, the ICSID Convention is not an FAA treaty. The FAA already
incorporates the New York Convention and the Panama Convention52
to enforce international commercial arbitration awards, typically
involving two private parties, which may include a state acting in its
commercial capacity rather than its governmental capacity. Neither of
those Conventions applies to ICSID arbitration awards.53 One
interesting thing to note about the New York and Panama Conventions
Convention expressly provides that ‘[e]xecution of the award shall be governed by the laws
concerning the execution of judgments in force in the State in whose territories such execution
is sought.’”) (parentheses, quotations, and brackets in original).
48. See ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 54; Smutny, Smith, & Pitt, supra note 42,
at 654.
49. See Smutny et al., supra note 42, at 654 (“The drafting history of the ICSID
Convention reveals that this provision was included at the request of the United States”).
50. See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the Federal
Arbitration Act applies in state court as well as federal court, despite language in the statute to
the contrary).
51. See 22 U.S.C. § 1650A (2018) (“The Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) shall
not apply to enforcement of awards rendered pursuant to the convention”) (parentheses in
original).
52. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
opened for signature, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, T.I.A.S. No. 6997
[hereinafter New York Convention]; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2018) (incorporating the New York
Convention into the Federal Arbitration Act); Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 1438 U.N.T.S. 24384 [hereinafter Panama Convention];
9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2018) (incorporating the Panama Convention into the Federal Arbitration
Act).
53. See 22 U.S.C. § 1650A (2018) (“The Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) shall
not apply to enforcement of awards rendered pursuant to the convention.”) (parentheses in
original).
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is that they both include a “public policy” exception to the enforcement
of an international arbitration awards—a feature that the ICSID
Convention does not include.54
Thus, can a federal court decline to enforce an ICSID award due
to public policy? The answer is unclear and has not yet been tested in
a US court. In Part III below, this Article presents a hypothetical
scenario based up on the facts of a real case as a way to explore this
presently theoretical question.
The United States framework for the law applicable to the
enforcement of ICSID awards is as follows. According to the
implementing statute, courts have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce
ICSID arbitration awards; state courts cannot hear these actions.55 In
addition, there is complete federal preemption of state law regarding
enforcing ICSID arbitration awards.56 What should US federal courts
do if they have to apply non-existent federal rules governing the
execution of ICSID convention awards?57 Given complete federal
preemption and the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts, can federal
54. See RESTATEMENT § 1, cmt. c1 (“Also central to the [ICSID] Convention regime is a
relatively unqualified obligation imposed on courts of contracting States to enforce awards;
those courts are not entitled to decline enforcement on public policy grounds, or on the other
bases permitted, for example, under the New York and Panama Conventions . . . ”).
55. Cf. RESTATEMENT § 5-6(A)(1) (“When Congress implemented the ICSID Convention
in 22 U.S.C. § 1650a, it included an express grant to federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
to enforce ICSID Convention awards and declared that jurisdiction to be exclusive.”); with id.
at cmt. a.i (“However, according to the prevailing view, taken by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, § 1650a’s grant of exclusive subject matter jurisdiction is superseded by the
subsequently enacted Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Thus, the FSIA and that statute
alone, confers federal subject matter jurisdiction in actions against a foreign State or
instrumentality to enforce ICSID Convention awards. Under the FSIA, jurisdiction in actions
against Foreign States and instrumentalities is not exclusive, though actions brought in state
court are removable to federal court”).
56. See RESTATEMENT § 1-9, cmt. c (“Although there are no known cases on point, federal
law preempts state law grounds for post-award relief as applied to ICSID Convention awards”).
57. Cf. RESTATEMENT § 1-6, Reporters’ Notes c (“An ICSID Convention arbitration
instead is governed by the ICSID Convention and its implementing legislation (22 U.S.C. §
1650a). The Restatement provides that “[a] court enforces an agreement to submit an investor–
State dispute to arbitration, whether conducted on an ICSID Convention or a non-ICSID
Convention basis, through any of the means available for enforcing an agreement to arbitrate set
forth in § 2.1.” See § 5.2. To the extent state law grounds for declining to enforce an agreement
providing for ICSID Convention arbitration are applicable, see § 5.1(a)(4), presumably they
would be evaluated under the preemption analysis set out in this Section”) (parentheses,
citations, and brackets in original).
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courts ever employ state law to fill in the gaps? 58 Presently, where
federal law preempts state law but does not provide an answer, state
law is indeed being used to fill in the gaps, particularly with respect to
the procedural aspects of enforcing an investment treaty arbitration
award.59 For example, state statutes of limitations apply to the
enforcement of court judgments of sister states; thus, those same state
statutes of limitations apply to the enforcement of an ICSID convention
award as a sister state court judgment.60 However, it is not clear
whether state law can be employed in all contexts in which federal law
is silent with respect to the enforcement of an ICSID award.61 This
Article explores this question further through the two case studies
presented in Part III.

58. Cf. id.
59. Cf. id.
60. See RESTATEMENT § 5-6(A)(5), Reporters’ Notes a.v (“[T]he ICSID implementing
statute, 22 U.S.C. § 1650a, specifically provides that the FAA does not apply to the enforcement
of ICSID Convention awards. But neither the ICSID Convention nor its implementing statute
establishes a limitations period either. Under these circumstances, courts have treated the
enforcement of ICSID Convention awards, for limitations purposes, in the same way they treat
the enforcement of final judgments of a sister-state court… ICSID Convention Article 54(1)
supports that position; it provides only that “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an award
rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed
by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.” Thus,
[a federal district] court found that “[b]ecause ICSID Convention awards are to be treated as
final judgments of a state court—rather than as arbitration awards—the most analogous state
statute of limitations is that which governs the enforcement of a final money judgment from the
court of another state”) (quotation in original).
61. Cf. RESTATEMENT § 1-6, Reporters’ Notes c (“An ICSID Convention arbitration
instead is governed by the ICSID Convention and its implementing legislation (22 U.S.C. §
1650a). The Restatement provides that “[a] court enforces an agreement to submit an investor–
State dispute to arbitration, whether conducted on an ICSID Convention or a non-ICSID
Convention basis, through any of the means available for enforcing an agreement to arbitrate set
forth in § 2.1.” See § 5.2. To the extent state law grounds for declining to enforce an agreement
providing for ICSID Convention arbitration are applicable, see § 5.1(a)(4), presumably they
would be evaluated under the preemption analysis set out in this Section”) (parentheses,
citations, and brackets in original).
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III. APPLYING DOMESTIC LAW TO ENFORCEMENT OF
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AWARDS
A.

BG Group v. Argentina: An Easier Case under ICSID

1. BG Group v. Argentina under the New York Convention
In its 2014 decision in BG Group PLC v. Argentina, the US
Supreme Court considered an arbitration award rendered against
Argentina in an UNCITRAL bilateral investment treaty arbitration
seated in Washington, D.C., which Argentina had challenged in the
federal courts at the seat of arbitration, which were the DC District and
Circuit courts.62 The pertinent issue on appeal was a challenge to the
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, which in essence required the court
to make an inquiry into the merits of the underlying dispute – which is
something that would not be allowed had this been an arbitration under
the ICSID treaty, for the reasons discussed in Part II of this Article.
The question before the Court was whether BG Group had to
satisfy a specific precondition before the arbitral tribunal could
properly assert jurisdiction over its dispute against Argentina, or
whether instead the tribunal could waive the precondition in light of the
unusual facts of the case.63 The precondition in the relevant bilateral
investment treaty between the United Kingdom and Argentina was a
requirement that BG Group had to attempt litigation in the Argentine
domestic court system for a minimum of eighteen months prior to filing
an arbitration.64 The unusual facts of the case that led to the arbitral
tribunal waiving this precondition and asserting jurisdiction were that
the dispute arose out of the Argentine economic crisis, during which
62. See BG Grp. PLC, 572 U.S. at 25. The BG Group v. Argentina arbitration proceeded
according to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Arbitration
Rules,
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2010Arbitration_rules.html
[https://perma.cc/FTL8-62BK].
63. Id.
64. See 1990 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, U.K.-Arg., art. VIII, Dec. 11, 1990, 1765 U.N.T.S. 38., available at
https://arbitrationlaw.com/sites/default/files/free_pdfs/uk-argentina_bit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L58F-9LZA] [hereinafter U.K.-Arg. BIT].
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time the Argentine government had taken measures which made it
impracticable at best and impossible at worst for claimants with claims
like BG Group’s claim to effectively litigate in the Argentine court
system.65 As a result, the arbitral tribunal decided that enforcing the
precondition in the treaty would have led to “‘absurd and unreasonable
result[s].’”66 The arbitral tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction and
rendered a US$185 million award against Argentina.67
BG Group filed a motion to confirm the award and Argentina filed
a motion to vacate the award in the DC District Court, which was the
proper venue under the FAA for an arbitral award to either be
confirmed or vacated when the arbitration was seated in D.C..68 The
DC District Court confirmed the award on the ground that, as a matter
of US arbitration law, the question of whether a precondition to arbitral
jurisdiction was satisfied was a question for the arbitral tribunal to
decide, and that the arbitral tribunal’s decision was entitled to the
deference of the court; thus, the District Court confirmed the arbitral
award.69 The DC Circuit reversed the decision and vacated the award
on the grounds that the court should interpret the precondition in the
treaty de novo, without deference to the view of the arbitrators, and
ruled that BG Group should have complied the requirement and
“‘commence[d] a lawsuit in Argentina’s courts and wait[ed] eighteen
months before filing for arbitration.’”70
65. BG Grp. PLC, 572 U.S. at 30–31 (“The panel pointed out that in 2002, the President
of Argentina had issued a decree staying for 180 days the execution of its courts’ final judgments
[and injunctions] in suits claiming harm as a result of the new economic measures. In addition,
Argentina had established a ‘renegotiation process’ for public service contracts, such as its
contract with MetroGAS, to alleviate the negative impact of the new economic measures. But
Argentina had simultaneously barred from participation in that ‘process’ firms that were
litigating against Argentina in court or in arbitration. These measures, while not making
litigation in Argentina’s courts literally impossible, nonetheless ‘hindered’ recourse ‘to the
domestic judiciary’ to the point where the Treaty implicitly excused compliance with the local
litigation requirement. Requiring a private party in such circumstances to seek relief in
Argentina’s courts for 18 months, the panel concluded, would lead to ‘absurd and unreasonable
result[s]’”) (internal citations omitted).
66. Id. at 31 (brackets in original).
67. Id. at 31.
68. See 9 U.S.C. § 204 (2018) (addressing venue and providing that an action to confirm
or vacate an award under the New York Convention may be brought “in such court for the
district and division which embraces the place designated in the agreement as the place of
arbitration if such place is within the United States.”) In the BG Group case, the place of
arbitration was Washington D.C., so the DC District Court was the appropriate venue for both
motions to be filed.
69. BG Grp. PLC, 572 U.S. at 31–32.
70. See id. at 32.
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The US Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed again,
thereby confirming the arbitral award.71 It is important to remember,
however, that confirmation—like recognition and enforcement—is not
the same as execution; Argentina did not immediately have to pay US
$185 million as a result of this case, and BG Group ended up having to
take its confirmed award elsewhere for execution.72 The majority
opinion articulated several rationales for this decision. First, the
majority ruled that this issue raised a question of procedural
arbitrability and that such a question was for primary determination by
the arbitrators. The majority based its ruling on its declaration that “[a]s
a general matter, a treaty is a contract, though between nations. Its
interpretation normally is, like a contract’s interpretation, a matter of
determining the parties’ intent.”73
Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part, in which
she took issue with the majority’s characterization of the “conditions
of consent” in the United Kingdom-Argentina treaty and how the term
“consent” should be construed in treaties, generally.74 Notably, both the
majority and concurring opinions examined the United States Korea
Free Trade Agreement in which they construed the section titled
“Conditions and Limitations on Consent [to Arbitration] of Each Party”
in that treaty more narrowly (i.e., making arbitral jurisdiction more
challenging to obtain) than the Court had construed the arbitration
provision in the United Kingdom-Argentina treaty at issue in the BG
Group case.75
Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Kennedy,76 in which he criticized the majority opinion for applying
international commercial arbitration principles—including ordinary
contract law—to an investment treaty arbitration in which the

71. See id. at 45. The vote among the Justices was 7-2.
72. See id. at 45 (reversing the DC Circuit decision, resulting in confirming the validity of
the arbitral award, which is not the same as execution or payment).
73. See id. at 37.
74. See id. at 45–49.
75. See id. at 39, 47.
76. See id. at 49–64.
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arbitration agreement does not even involve privity between the
parties.77
Due to this lack of privity, Justice Roberts argued that the
requirement to litigate in Argentine courts for eighteen months prior to
filing an arbitration was actually a precondition to Argentina’s consent
to arbitration.78 Since the requirement was not fulfilled, Argentina
therefore did not consent to arbitration with BG Group; therefore, a
valid arbitration agreement did not exist between BG Group and
Argentina; thus, the resulting arbitral award should be vacated due to
this jurisdictional defect.79
Because the parties chose to arbitration under the UNCITRAL
rules rather than the ICSID Convention for their arbitration,80 however,
the award was confirmed under the New York Convention.81 This
77. For a discussion of why the arbitration agreement in an investment treaty is “arbitration
without privity,” see generally Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.
FOREIGN INV. L. J. 232 (1995).
78. See BG Grp. PLC, 572 U.S. at 49-64 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. It is important to note that most (and likely all) investment treaties do not require the
claimant to articulate or document a particular reason for choosing one arbitration regime (e.g.,
UNCITRAL) over another (e.g., ICISID). In the spirit of the hypothetical scenarios posed in this
Article, the Author offers the following wild speculation about the reasons that BG Group chose
to file its case under UNCITRAL rather than ICSID: enforcing awards against Argentina can be
extremely difficult and Argentina was becoming increasingly disillusioned with the ICSID
convention such that, in 2012, Argentina had expressed an interest in repudiating the ICSID
convention, although it never did follow through legislatively and remains a party to the ICSID
convention to this day; in contrast, the New York Convention is a relatively uncontroversial
means to enforce a traditional monetary arbitral award. See Leon E. Trakman & David
Musayelyan, The Repudiation of Investor–State Arbitration and Subsequent Treaty Practice:
The Resurgence of Qualified Investor–State Arbitration, 31 ICSID REVIEW - FOREIGN INV. L.
J. 194, 197-204 (2016). (“[I]n 2012, Venezuela and Argentina announced their plans to terminate
their participation in the ICSID Convention. . . . Venezuela’s withdrawal was finalized in July
of 2012 while Argentina is yet to announce its future ISA policies . . . . [W]hile Argentina had
initially supported Venezuela’s initiative and in 2012 proposed a parliamentary bill to terminate
its ICSID membership, at the time of writing [i.e., 2016], no decision has been made with regard
to its withdrawal from ICSID. It is reasonable to suggest that the recent ISA decisions rendered
in Argentina’s favour [sic] and its on-going negotiations with the ICSID and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), mediated by the United States, have encouraged Argentina to reconsider
its policy. The country has 55 active BITs and has not terminated any of these treaties”). The
question of why a claimant may choose one investment arbitration regime over another when
filing a case is ripe for further research.
81. Both the United Kingdom and Argentina are parties to the New York Convention.
Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York,
1958)
(the
“New
York
Convention”),
UNITED
NATIONS,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards/status2
[https://perma.cc/5SFB-U2BM] (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).
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choice enabled the US Supreme Court to apply domestic US arbitration
law to enforcement of the award, because the New York Convention is
incorporated into the FAA, Chapter 2, as discussed above.82 The
Supreme Court also invoked ordinary common law regarding
contracts, declaring that the “treaty is a contract,”83 which is a debatable
presumption,84 but one that was essential to the overarching rationale
that the majority of the Supreme Court adopted.
Furthermore, it is crucial to note that the US Supreme Court
applied ordinary contract interpretation principles to a bilateral
investment treaty as a bystander to the treaty, since the United States is
not a party to the United Kingdom-Argentina treaty invoked in the
arbitration. Consequently, this Author theorizes that US Supreme Court
would have viewed this question differently had the award been
rendered pursuant the ICSID treaty, of which the United States is a
member state. This can be inferred by the way in which both the
majority and concurring opinions interpret the arbitration consent
provisions in the United States-Korea treaty more restrictively—an
interpretation that may prove to be favorable to the United States if a
dispute arises between the United States and a Korean investor in the
future. Perhaps it is far easier to declare that someone else’s treaty is a
mere contract than to declare that your own treaty is one!
2. Hypothetical: BG Group v. Argentina under the ICSID
Convention
To transform this case into a hypothetical scenario, assume that
the only change to the facts above is that the parties had chosen
arbitration under the ICSID Convention. This is by no means a far82. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2018).
83. See BG Grp. PLC, 572 U.S. at 37 (“As a general matter, a treaty is a contract, though
between nations. Its interpretation normally is, like a contract’s interpretation, a matter of
determining the parties’ intent”).
84. Id. at 49 (“The Court begins by deciding a different case, ‘initially treat[ing] the
document before us as if it were an ordinary contract between private parties.’ Ante, at 1206.
The ‘document before us,’ of course, is nothing of the sort. It is instead a treaty between two
sovereign nations: the United Kingdom and Argentina. No investor is a party to the agreement.
Having elided this rather important fact for much of its analysis, the majority finally ‘relax[es]
[its] ordinary contract assumption and ask[s] whether the fact that the document before us is a
treaty makes a critical difference to [its] analysis.’ Ante, at 1208. It should come as no surprise
that, after starting down the wrong road, the majority ends up at the wrong place”).
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fetched hypothetical scenario.85 The parties could have chosen ICSID
arbitration according to the United Kingdom-Argentina BIT,86 and both
the United Kingdom and Argentina were parties to the ICSID
Convention at the time of this dispute.87 Additionally, the fact that they
chose Washington DC as the seat of arbitration was likely no accident.
ICSID arbitrations are typically seated in Washington D.C., and the
hearings are often held in the offices of the World Bank. Moreover, the
parties likely wanted recourse to the DC courts, which are courts that
are sophisticated in matters relating to investment treaty arbitration,
because their jurisdiction encompasses the ICSID headquarters as the
usual seat for ICSID arbitrations.
Had the parties chosen ICSID arbitration, the final result would
likely have been the same—the award would have been confirmed or
recognized. The award itself was not unreasonable (in light of the
typical size of investment treaty arbitration awards and their attendant
cost allocations), and there were no other procedural irregularities.88
The crucial difference is that the US Supreme Court would not have
been able to apply ordinary contract law in its decision, because the
ICSID treaty requires courts in the member states to enforce ICSID
Convention awards without inquiring into the jurisdiction of the
arbitral tribunal.89 Nor would it have been able to apply the FAA or the
85. This Article is not the first ever to explore this question in relation to the BG Group
case, but it is the first ever to explore this question with respect to the Hardy case. Prior research
exploring this question with respect to the BG Group case was published in 2014 just before and
just after the US Supreme Court rendered its decision in March 2014. Cf. Jonathan Lim & Luis
Miguel Velarde Saffer, BG Group v. Argentina: Would ICSID Arbitration Have Been Different?,
KLUWER
ARB.
BLOG
(Feb.
4,
2014),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2014/02/04/bg-group-v-argentina-would-icsidarbitration-have-been-different/ [https://perma.cc/Q6HD-S8PP]. J.W. Lim & L.M. Velarde
Saffer, Opportunities and Risks in the Upcoming BG Group v Argentina Decision, 11
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2014) (published in June 2014 by the same authors as the
aforementioned
blog
post),
https://www.transnational-disputemanagement.com/article.asp?key=2111 [https://perma.cc/S9WP-ZMSE].
86. See U.K.-Arg. BIT, supra note 64, art. 8(3)(a).
87. See List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as of April 12,
2019) ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/List of Contracting States
and Other Signatories of the Convention - Latest.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNV9-THA8] (last
visited Nov. 13, 2019).
88. For an exhaustive empirical examination of costs in investment treaty arbitration, see
generally SUSAN FRANCK, ARBITRATION COSTS: MYTHS AND REALITIES IN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION (2019).
89 See RESTATEMENT § 1-1, cmt. r.3 (“Also central to the [ICSID] Convention regime is a
relatively unqualified obligation imposed on courts of contracting States to enforce awards;
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New York Convention, because Congress has explicitly stated that
those two bodies of law do not apply to the enforcement of an ICSID
Convention arbitration award.90
What rule could the Court have applied—or could future courts
apply—in a case like this in the absence of recourse to the FAA, the
New York Convention, arbitration law, or contract law, generally?
Here, the result would not have changed, because the default rule under
the ICSID Convention is to confirm the award, as the Supreme Court
did here, despite the disagreement among the Justices regarding the
reasoning. The Court would have had an explicit obligation under the
ICSID Convention to confirm the award at face value and not to inquire
into any allegations that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction.
Instead, the sole method for challenging the jurisdiction of an arbitral
tribunal under the ICSID Convention is through an ad hoc annulment
committee organized by the ICSID Secretariat.91 Thus, the entire
analysis conducted by the DC District, DC Circuit, and US Supreme
Court regarding arbitration law and contract law – which this Article
argues is part of the inherent power of the court when enforcing
judgments and arbitral awards – would have directly conflicted with
the United States’ obligations under the ICSID treaty.
Overall, however, BG Group v. Argentina is an easy case to
translate into a hypothetical ICSID Convention award. A different road
would have been taken in the court’s reasoning, but the destination
would have been the same – the award would have been confirmed. In
contrast, the next case study is considerably more difficult to reconcile
with the ICSID Convention.

those courts are not entitled to decline enforcement on public policy grounds, or on the other
bases permitted, for example, under the New York and Panama Conventions”).
90. See 22 U.S.C. § 1650a (2018) (“The Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) shall
not apply to enforcement of awards rendered pursuant to the convention”) (parentheses and
citation in original).
91. See ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 52.
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Hardy Exploration v. India: A Harder Case under ICSID

1. Hardy Exploration v. India under the New York Convention
On June 7, 2018, in Hardy Exploration v. India, the DC District
Court declined to enforce an investment arbitration award because,
among other reasons, it determined that granting specific performance
against a foreign state and granting the corresponding interest provision
in the award would undermine US public policy to respect to the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states.92 On November 27,
2018, before the parties had filed any briefs in the DC Circuit court,
Hardy unilaterally withdrew its appeal petition without stating its
reasons for doing so.93 Presently, the status of the arbitral award is
unknown.
The investment arbitration had been initiated pursuant to a
contract between Hardy Exploration and India called a Production
Sharing Agreement (“PSC”) for the extraction, development and
production of oil and natural gas in a particular ocean location off the
southeastern coast of India, referred to as the “Block” in the court’s
opinion.94 The timing of the appraisal and assessment period was at
issue because the parties disputed whether either oil or natural gas had
been discovered at the site.95 As a result, India revoked Hardy’s rights
to develop the Block, and Hardy attempted to negotiate with India for
approximately one year to no avail.96 Hardy then commenced
arbitration in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia pursuant to Article 33 of the
PSC to resolve the question regarding the appraisal and assessment
period of the Block.97 The arbitral tribunal consisted of three former
92. See Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India), Inc, 314 F.Supp.3d at 113; Lacey Yong, Specific
Performance Award Against India Cannot be Enforced, says DC Court, GLOBAL ARBITRATION
REVIEW (June 8, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1170382/specificperformance-award-against-india-cannot-be-enforced-says-dc-court [https://perma.cc/TN8GZ3R2].
93. See Motion for Withdrawal Without Consent, 1, Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India), Inc v.
India, Ministry of Petroleum & Nat. Gas, No. 18-7093 (D.C. Cir.). Presumably, this motion was
granted, and the case was dismissed, because it no longer appears on the DC Circuit’s Docket
and no judgment was rendered in the DC Circuit.
94. See Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India), Inc, 314 F.Supp.3d at 99-100. For an explanation of
the policy changes in India that enabled Hardy Exploration to acquire the “blocks,” see
Muhammad Azhar, New Exploration Licensing Pol’y (NELP) in India, 35 OPEC ENERGY REV.
174, 175-76 (2011).
95. See Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India), Inc, 314 F.Supp.3d at 99.
96. See id. at 101.
97. Id.
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Chief Justices of the Supreme Court of India,98 which is highly unusual
because most parties in investment arbitration opt for tribunal members
with different nationalities than the parties.99
The arbitral tribunal issued an award ordering “that ‘the parties
shall be immediately relegated to the position in which they stood prior
to the order of the relinquishment and the block shall be restored to
[Hardy].’”100 This was tantamount to an order of specific performance
against India.101 In addition, the tribunal ordered India to pay pre-award
interest at a rate of nine percent per year up to the date of the award and
then eighteen percent per year thereafter until India paid the award, and
ordered India to pay some of Hardy’s arbitration costs.102 India paid the
arbitration costs portion of the award, but did not comply with any other
parts of the award.103 India and Hardy filed several petitions in the
Delhi High Court and, afterwards, in the Supreme Court of India to set
aside or enforce the award, respectively, between 2013 and 2016.104
While awaiting delayed decisions in the Indian courts, in January 2016,
Hardy filed a petition in the DC District court which the court’s opinion
calls a “petition for enforcement” even though the title of Hardy’s filing
was “Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award,” and India used both the
terms in its response to Hardy’s petition, which further illustrates the
confusion surrounding the use of these terms, as mentioned in the
Introduction to this Article.105
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 39 (“The majority of the arbitrators
shall be nationals of States other than the Contracting State party to the dispute and the
Contracting State whose national is a party to the dispute; provided, however, that the foregoing
provisions of this Article shall not apply if the sole arbitrator or each individual member of the
Tribunal has been appointed by agreement of the parties”).
100. See Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India) Inc, 314 F.Supp.3d at 101.
101. See id. at 109-14 (discussing the tribunal’s order that India specifically perform by
restoring the Block to Hardy).
102. See id. at 101.
103. See id. at 101-02.
104. See id. at 102.
105. See id. at 102 (“Due to this delay, HEPI decided to avail itself of the enforcement
powers of this Court as well, and in January 2016 filed the instant petition for enforcement of
the arbitral award. See Pet’r’s Pet. to Confirm Arbitration Award [‘Pet’r’s Pet.’], ECF No. 1.
Following briefing and an order from this Court regarding proper service of India, India filed its
response to HEPI’s petition, arguing that the Court should decline to enforce the arbitral award
because confirming both the specific performance and interest aspects of the Award would
violate U.S. public policy”) (citations and brackets in original) (emphasis added).
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The DC District Court decided that it did not need to stay Hardy’s
enforcement action, meaning that it did not need to wait for the
Supreme Court of India to make a decision on the pending petitions.106
The court then noted that the New York Convention provides that a
court may decline the enforcement of an international arbitration award
if it is “contrary to the public policy of the country.”107 In contrast, it is
important to note that the ICSID Convention contains no analogous
public policy-related provision.108 The Court in Hardy cited several
cases from the US Supreme Court, the DC Circuit and the Second
Circuit to fashion the following comprehensive rule regarding the
application of the public policy exception in the New York Convention:
“The goal of the [New York] Convention, and the principal
purpose underlying American adoption and implementation of it,
was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial
arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the
standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and
arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.” Due to the
“‘emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution’ . . . the FAA affords [a] district court little discretion in
refusing or deferring enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.”
Courts in this circuit have repeatedly held that “courts should rely
on the public policy exception only ‘in clear-cut cases’ where
‘enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions
of morality and justice.’ “ The public policy defense under Article
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention is to be construed narrowly
and is available only where an arbitration award “tends clearly to
undermine the public interest, the public confidence in the
administration of the law, or security for individual rights of
personal liberty or of private property.” Such a public policy must
be “explicit” and “well defined and dominant, and is to be
ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents.” The
“provision was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of international
106. See id. at 108.
107. Id. at 107 (citing the New York Convention’s public policy exception to enforcement,
located in art. V(2)(b)).
108. Cf. Smutny et al., supra note 35, at 666 (“Notably, although Contracting States to the
ICSID Convention are not bound to enforce non-pecuniary obligations, they are not prohibited
from doing so. In practice, however, as Broches observed, there are ‘practical difficulties
involved in the enforcement of non-pecuniary awards,’ and the drafters of the Convention had
concerns that enforcement by one state’s courts of an obligation of another state to perform or
abstain from performing a specific act in some instances would not be permitted on public policy
grounds”).

2019]

A HARDY CASE MAKES BAD LAW

27

politics under the rubric of ‘public policy,’ “ and it does not
provide that awards that might contravene U.S. interests may be
resisted on such grounds. The public policy exception cannot be
used to simply question the merits of the underlying award.109

The Court went on to provide the following formulation regarding
the task before it in this case:
Therefore, the Court must determine whether the confirmation of
the specific performance and interest portions of the arbitral award
violate the United States’ most basic notions of morality and
justice, defined by its laws and legal precedents . . . . This case
presents the Court with a unique opportunity to balance two
important U.S. public policy values: respect for the sovereignty of
other nations and respect for foreign arbitral agreements.110

The Court then addressed only one of India’s arguments with respect
to specific performance, and it agreed with India regarding “the United
States’ public policy interest in respecting the right of other nations to
control the extraction and processing of natural resources within their
own sovereign territories.”111 On that basis alone, the court declined
“confirmation” (switching wording again) of the specific performance
portion of the word.112 The Court also examined the exceptions in the
FSIA and concluded that the statute offered no authority regarding
whether the court could order specific performance against a foreign
government, regardless of whether such performance would take place
inside or outside of the United States.113 The Court noted that other
examples in which United States courts have ordered extraterrestrial
specific performance have been against corporations or against
sovereigns in litigation, rather than international arbitration.114 After
examining a few of these examples, the Court concluded that:
[T]his infringement on India’s national sovereignty would
contravene the United States’ public policy interest in respecting
the territorial integrity of other nations for several reasons . . . .
109. Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India) Inc, 314 F.Supp.3d at 109 (internal citations omitted).
110. Id. at 109.
111. Id. at 110.
112. Id. at 110 (“The Court therefore finds that India has met its burden of demonstrating
that confirmation of the specific performance portion of the award would be contrary to U.S.
public policy, and therefore the Court declines to confirm this portion of the award”).
113. See id. at 111.
114. See id. at 111-12.
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[F]orced interference with India’s complete control over its
territory violates public policy to the extent necessary to overcome
the United States’ policy preference for the speedy confirmation
of arbitral awards. After all, the issuance of “extraterritorial
injunctions often raise serious concerns for sovereignty and
enforceability which compel denial.” The power to grant
extraterritorial injunctions “should be exercised with great
reluctance when it [would] be difficult to secure compliance . . . or
when the exercise of such power is fraught with possibilities of
discord and conflict with the authorities of another country.”115

The Court then discussed the FSIA’s grant of authority to enforce
judgments and awards against foreign sovereign only with respect to
“specific, domestic methods of ensuring that plaintiffs receive those
damages, [which] demonstrates the United States’ public policy
commitment to respecting the sovereignty of foreign nations by only
holding them liable for certain forms of relief.”116 The Court also noted
that the FSIA does not mention specific enforcement or extraterritorial
enforcement, except in cases of terrorism or expropriation, neither of
which applied in the Hardy case.117 The Court also seemed to invoke
the “Golden Rule”—do unto others as you would have them do unto
you—when it stated that
[C]onfirmation of this award would “raise the specter of the
opposite situation coming to pass; namely, a foreign court
confirming (or the court going further and granting injunctive
relief directly) against the United States for acts it has taken within
its own borders or respecting its own territory.” [citing India’s
submission] Given that the United States has not waived its
sovereign immunity in its own courts against specific performance
in contract cases, it would defy comprehension that it would be in
compliance with U.S. public policy to create a situation in which
a foreign court could order the U.S. to specifically perform its
portion of a contract.118

The Court then concluded that Hardy’s best recourse with respect
the specific performance portion of the award was through the Indian
Courts, and then moved on to address the interest provision in the
award.119 The Court concluded that:
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 113.
Id. at 113.
See id. at 114.
Id. at 114 (internal citation omitted).
See id. at 114.
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[B]ecause the two components of the award are inextricably
intertwined, the Court also cannot award interest predicated on
compliance with that [specific performance] component of the
award. To order otherwise would be to impermissibly coerce India
into complying with an order that this Court has determined it
cannot issue. The Court cannot coerce through an interest award
an action that it cannot order directly . . . . [T]he Court will . . .
look at the functional effect of the proposed order before it, rather
than just its form . . . . This portion of the award is so inseparable
from the specific performance portion of the award, the
confirmation of which would violate U.S. public policy, that the
confirmation of the interest portion of the award must also be
found, necessarily, to violate U.S. public policy. India may
ultimately need to pay [Hardy] the millions of dollars in interest it
now owes—but if it does, it will be because a court with the
authority to enforce the entire arbitration award, including the
specific performance portion, has ordered it to do so. Because this
Court does not have such authority, it cannot order this
payment.120

2. Hypothetical: Hardy Exploration v. India under the ICSID
Convention
Although the ruling was not tested by an appeal,121 the facts of
this case and the reasoning of the DC District Court opinion are very
instructive when converted into an ICSID Convention hypothetical
scenario.122
Assume that, instead of arbitration under a contract, the tribunal
was constituted under the ICSID Convention by invoking the
protections of the bilateral investment treaty between India and the
United Kingdom.123 Should the DC District Court handle this new
120. Id. at 115-16.
121. Hardy Exploration withdrew its appeal before the briefs were filed. See supra note
82.
122. Without access to the arbitration agreement contained in the “PSC” mentioned in the
case, it is impossible to know which arbitration rules the parties chose. This information is not
mentioned in the court documents, and the arbitral award is not publicly available. The Author
proceeds on the assumption that this was not an ICSID case.
123. See 1994 Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of India for the Promotion and
Protection
of
Investments,
U.K.-India,
Mar.
14,
1994,
available
at
https://arbitrationlaw.com/sites/default/files/free_pdfs/uk-india_bit.pdf
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hypothetical set of facts differently than the Hardy case, simply
because it would be an arbitration conducted under the ICSID treaty?
This Article has previously noted that the ICSID convention itself
does not contain a public policy exception, unlike the New York
Convention.124 The ICSID convention was concluded in 1965, which
was seven years after the New York Convention was concluded in
1958.125 This implies that the drafters of the ICSID convention were
well aware of the New York Convention’s public policy exception and
chose not to include a public policy exception in the ICSID Convention
on purpose. Thus, in theory, the court should not be able to decline
enforcement of an ICSID arbitration award on the basis of public policy
as a treaty-based concept.126
However, since the ICSID Convention converts the arbitral award
to a judgment,127 it may perhaps be possible that the Court could decline
to enforce on the ground that it would not enforce a court judgment that
violates US public policy. The underlying question is whether the
ICSID Convention is enforcing an arbitral award or is simply
facilitating the conversion of an arbitral award to a court judgment that
may be enforced as an ordinary court judgment would be. Regardless
of the answer to that question, the drafters of the ICSID convention
seem to have taken this into account when they required that the
member states can only apply their ordinary procedures for enforcing
judgments to enforcing ICSID arbitration awards and exempted such
awards from the other provisions of domestic law or other international
[https://perma.cc/9EHF-8Z9B]. Both the United Kingdom and India are also parties to the
ICSID Convention. See List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as
of April 12, 2019) ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/List of
Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention - Latest.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PNV9-THA8] (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).
124. Cf. Smutny et, U.K.-Arg., art. VIII, Dec. 11, 1990, 1765 U.N.T.S. 38., al., supra note
35, at 665.
125. See supra note 52.
126. See RESTATEMENT § 1-1, cmt. r.3 (“Also central to the [ICSID] Convention regime
is a relatively unqualified obligation imposed on courts of contracting States to enforce awards;
those courts are not entitled to decline enforcement on public policy grounds, or on the other
bases permitted, for example, under the New York and Panama Conventions”).
127. See ICSID Convention, supra note 12, at art. 54 (“Each Contracting State shall
recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court
in that State. A Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or
through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a
final judgment of the courts of a constituent state”).
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treaties, including exempting the awards from the public policy
exception.128
What if we add an additional variable to the hypothetical scenario:
the seat of arbitration? A court at the seat of arbitration has far more
power over the validity of an arbitral award than a court elsewhere. In
the original case, the seat of arbitration was Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
a fact that greatly diminished the power of the DC District Court over
the award.129 Furthermore, the Delhi High Court in India determined
that it also did not have the power to set aside the award, because the
seat of arbitration had been in Malaysia, but neither did the Delhi High
Court enforce the award.130 Thus, the DC District Court – despite its
confusing terminology in the opinion – was likely limited to confirming
or recognizing the award, not enforcing (or executing) the award as the
terminology in the opinion may have suggested. Under the original
facts of the Hardy case, the Court declined to even recognize the award,
indicating the strength of the public policy exception in the New York
Convention, which was incorporated into US domestic law through the
FAA. Under the ICSID Convention, however, the DC District Court
would not have been able to use the public policy exception at all.
Another twist on this hypothetical would be to examine the
question of whether the DC District Court would take a different view
of this problem in the future if the Supreme Court of India later
confirms the award, or if a court in Kuala Lumpur – the seat of
arbitration – confirms the award. The Author posits that if a court at the
seat of arbitration were to confirm the award, the US Court would still
likely decline to “enforce” it. Even if the Court hypothetically did
“enforce” the award, such “enforcement” would basically be an empty
blessing of the award, because the United States has no police power
to execute a judgment or award of specific performance against a
foreign sovereign under the FSIA or under general principles of
international law.
For instance, it is doubtful that the United States military would
involve itself in forcing India to relinquish the Block back to Hardy for
128. Cf. Smutny et al., supra note 35, at 665.
129. See Hardy Exp. & Prod. (India) Inc, 314 F.Supp.3d at 107 (“the Court will take
India’s word that Indian courts evaluate whether arbitral awards comport with Indian law when
considering whether to enforce that award, a power that American courts do not have, until the
award has actually been set aside by a competent authority”).
130. See id. at 104.
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a variety of reasons, not the least of which would be the political and
possibly military backlash that would follow such an action. Thus,
really only Indian courts can execute this arbitral award, regardless of
the origin of the award. Perhaps this is one reason that the parties chose
three former justices of the Supreme Court of India as their
arbitrators.131 Individuals of such a stature in that nation would likely
be among the only private citizens who, when serving as arbitrators,
would have enough respect and authority to be able to order India to
surrender control over one of its natural resources. The retired justices
probably thought that they had the power to render an award ordering
the specific performance against the Government of India. They
probably did not consider that the place of enforcement of the arbitral
award might be outside of India, in which case the enforcing court
would find it problematic to order India to specifically perform that
portion of their arbitration award.
There is a second way in which the seat of arbitration could be a
variable in this hypothetical. As mentioned earlier in this Article,
Washington DC is the typical seat for most ICSID arbitrations,
regardless of the nationalities or locations of the parties involved. Thus,
a final twist on this hypothetical would be if the Hardy case had
involved an ICSID arbitration seated in Washington DC with the same
three Indian retired justices. This twist seemingly infuses the DC
District Court with significant power with respect to this award. The
tone of the Court’s opinion – in which the court mentions “set aside”
several times in the same breath as mentioning public policy – suggests
that the Court would have either attempted to set aside the award if it
had the power to do so or would simply decline to confirm it (as it did
in the Hardy case), in which case the Indian courts or Malaysian courts
could potentially still enforce it.132 The entire analysis presupposes,
however, that the traditional “legal seat” theory of arbitration applies
to this hypothetical scenario.
In fact, the ICSID convention introduces two additional wrinkles.
The first wrinkle is that, although DC is the literal “place” of arbitration
in this hypothetical, ICSID arbitrations technically do not have a legal
“seat” in the way that international commercial arbitrations do.133 Thus,
131. See id. at 101 (“A tribunal of three former Chief Justices of the Supreme Court of
India was empaneled to preside over these proceedings”).
132. See id. at 104.
133. See RESTATEMENT § 1-1, Reporters’ Notes cc.ii (“Awards not falling under the
ICSID Convention may also be classified by nationality, as would occur with respect to
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in reality, the DC Circuit would not have the power to set aside an
ICSID Convention award, even if DC were the seat of arbitration.
Instead, the DC Circuit could only decline to enforce the award, as it
did in the original case opinion.
The second and last wrinkle that this hypothetical adds to the
scenario is the ICSID ad hoc annulment committee. Had this award
been rendered by an ICSID tribunal, India would have been able to file
a petition for annulment at the ICSID Secretariat, located in DC.134 The
annulment body constituted by ICSID would have the power to annul
the award, similarly to a court at the “seat” of arbitration in a typical
international commercial arbitration. Similarly, had Hardy filed the
same petition to enforce at the DC District Court, India would have
been able to file a counter-petition for a stay with the DC District Court
to ask them to stay enforcement of the award pending the decision of
the annulment committee.135 Hypothetically, this Author believes that
the annulment committee would look critically upon the Hardy v. India
arbitral award and may even have annulled it and put in place a new
tribunal to re-hear the case.136 Thus, it is possible that the award would
not have been submitted to the DC courts at all for recognition and
enforcement.
This Article now turns to the interest awarded in the Hardy case.
The court in the hypothetical ICSID arbitration scenario technically has
the implied power to refuse to enforce the specific performance aspects
of the award, because the ICSID treaty does not require enforcement of
non-monetary remedies, which would include specific performance.137
The treaty only requires courts to enforce the pecuniary obligations in
the award.138 However, the court also refused to enforce the interest

commercial awards. Such awards are deemed rendered at the seat of arbitration, see subsection
(oo) (definition of “seat”), and to carry the national affiliation of that seat for purposes of any
reciprocity requirement that may obtain. . . . It is by contrast a non sequitur to speak in terms of
an ICSID Convention award having a nationality; such awards are a-national”) (cross-reference
in original).
134. See ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 52.
135. See ICSID Convention, supra note 12, arts. 50, 51, 52.
136. See ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 52.
137. See ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 54.
138. See ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 54.
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provisions in the award, which arguably is a pecuniary obligation.139
The court justified this by saying that the interest provisions were a
penalty and therefore infringed upon the sovereignty of the state,
according to US public policy.140 In other words, the court decided that
the arbitral tribunal had attempted to use the interest award to further
exacerbate the specific performance order as a punishment to India. It
was possible for the court to decline to enforce the interest provision
because the action to enforce the award was brought under the New
York convention, which – as mentioned above – includes a provision
that allows states to refuse to enforce an award if it violates their
domestic public policy.
The ICSID Convention in contrast contains no such public policy
exception and requires courts to enforce pecuniary obligations.141 Thus,
a court that would refuse to enforce the interest part of the award under
the ICSID Convention would likely be violating the exact wording of
the Convention with respect to the obligation to enforce the pecuniary
provisions of the award, even if the court could somehow refuse to
enforce the specific performance provisions. Similarly, the argument
that the court could refuse to enforce the specific performance
provisions might also be challenged on the ground that the specific
performance in this award was part of the pecuniary compensation for
the investor, Hardy, who was injured when the ICSID member state,
India, took the Block away. Hence, if this were an ICSID award, then
Hardy might be able to argue that the entire award was in fact pecuniary
in nature—including the specific performance portion, because Hardy
was going to engage in economic activity on the Block to generate
pecuniary benefits. Thus, it is possible that if the ICSID Convention
applied to this arbitration award, the court would have been in violation
of the treaty had it declined to enforce the specific performance
provision as well.
On the other hand, how can a US court order the Government of
India to do anything without its permission? The ICSID treaty states
that courts must enforce pecuniary obligations most likely because
those obligations can be enforced outside of the territory of the member
states. Many ICSID member states have physical and financial assets
139. See Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India) Inc, 314 F.Supp.3d at 114-16 (analyzing the interest
provision and declining to enforce it). Cf. ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 54 (obligating
states to enforce pecuniary obligations in ICSID arbitral awards).
140. See supra note 139.
141. See ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 54.
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in the territories of other member states. Thus, a winning investor could
go to a different member country to enforce the award. Specific
performance—and in particular, specific performance over India’s
physical territory in the Hardy case—meant that the United States court
would be ordering a foreign government to do something within its own
territory with respect to access and control of its own physical natural
resources. This is far more problematic from a foreign relations
perspective.
The DC District Court was confident of its decision in the Hardy
case because it had the New York Convention public policy escape
hatch that is reliable and relatively easy to trigger. This Author believes
that the Court would have been tremendously conflicted regarding its
enforcement obligations had this case been brought under the ICSID
convention, because one of the hallmarks of sovereignty is that a
government does not have to obey a foreign court with respect to
actions within its own borders. This is another example of the clash
between the ICSID treaty’s enforcement obligations and the inherent
power of the court system to enforce the public policy of the land.
A rejoinder to this counterargument might be that the ICSID
Convention is a delegation of sovereign power to the international
arbitrators that are chosen by the states to be on the roster of ICSID
arbitrators to serve as the deciders of the disputes that arise under the
treaty.142 By extension, one could argue that the states have delegated
sovereign power to the arbitrators through the ICSID treaty such that,
when they render their award, the states impliedly agree to be bound.143
The ICSID Convention provides that member states agree to comply
142. Cf. e.g., Adam Feibelman, Law in the Global Order: The IMF and Financial
Regulation, 49 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 687, 738 (2017) (“[Anne Marie] Slaughter’s concept
of vertical networks provides a useful template for considering the Fund’s actual role. Her chief
examples of supranational enforcement institutions within vertical governance networks are the
International Criminal Court and the WTO’s dispute resolution panels. These are, in Slaughter’s
terms, genuinely supranational organizations to which their members have ceded a meaningful
degree of sovereignty. Structurally, the Fund serves a similar function as these other
supranational institutions—enforcing state-level obligations and commitments made by
participating states. Thus, financial regulation is not a model of global governance in which
networks of regulators have completely replaced diplomats or ministers; rather, it is a more
familiar, if complicated, example of collaborative effort between domestic regulators, state-level
obligations, and international institutions representing a range of legal formality”).
143. Cf. id.
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voluntarily with awards rendered by ICSID arbitral tribunals.144 Thus,
the action would only reach a domestic court if the state refuses to
comply with the award voluntarily, as in the Hardy case.
This line of reasoning reveals a remarkable paradox. The ICSID
Convention makes the courts of the member states the enforcers of
obligations that the arbitrators were empowered by the member states
to impose upon the members states, but which the arbitrators have no
police power to enforce themselves against those same member states.
If the courts of the member states could not enforce the ICSID arbitral
awards, then the system would have no “teeth” and would essentially
be futile. Hence the circular conundrum: the member states of the
ICSID Convention delegated to the arbitrators the power to render
awards that the courts can only enforce if the awards do not infringe
upon the sovereignty that the states had delegated to the arbitrators
through the ICSID Convention. At present, there is no solution to this
conundrum, and it will likely not be addressed unless or until at Hardylike arbitration award under the ICSID Convention is brought before a
US court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Hardy case is certainly a hard case in danger of making bad
law. The conundrum presented is between Scylla and Charybdis.145
Either the arbitrators are exceeding their powers in rendering an award
granting specific performance against a member state, in which case
the courts of other member states do not have to enforce the award, or
the courts of other member states would have to assert an
unprecedented level of extraterritorial authority in order to enforce the
arbitral award rendered by the Hardy arbitrators. Which is it? The
answer is unsettled, because there have not yet been any court cases in
the United States to test this question. Neither will Hardy test this
question, since the appeal has ended.
144. See ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 53 (“Each party shall abide by and comply
with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant
to the relevant provisions of this Convention”).
145. Cf. between Scylla and Charybdis, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/between_scylla_and_charybdis
[https://perma.cc/5KFZ-DK8Q] (last visited Nov. 13, 2019) (“Greek Mythology(.) Used to refer
to a situation involving two dangers in which an attempt to avoid one increases the risk from the
other”).
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Nevertheless, it appears that the DC district court in the Hardy
case has decided against the latter scenario, and in so doing, preserved
the inherent authority of the court to decline to enforce judgments—
including those converted from arbitral awards—that the court believes
“violate the United States’ most basic notions of morality and justice,
defined by its laws and legal precedents.”146 While the facts of this case
seem particularly unusual, this type of situation will likely arise more
often as parties become emboldened to seek specific performance as a
remedy in investment arbitration, rather than only money damages.
The foregoing discussion has tremendous implications regarding
the courts of nations potentially infringing greatly upon the sovereignty
of other nations in the name of complying with the demands of the
ICSID treaty. The question is whether such a modus operandi is
reasonable, and if so, whether it is sustainable, in light of the evershifting geopolitical dynamic of modern times. Investment treaty
arbitration has been under fire for the past several years, and cases like
the two above—or even worse, like the hypotheticals this Article posed
following the Hardy case—might eventually lead to a coup d’état of
the entire system of ICSID arbitration, at best in favor of an improved
system or at worst as a move toward geopolitical chaos and a return to
“gunboat diplomacy.”147 In the meantime, courts will need to find ways
to discharge the obligations of their sovereigns under treaties like
ICSID while also maintaining their integrity as, hopefully, apolitical
institutions of “morality and justice, defined by [their] laws and legal
precedents.”148

146. Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India) Inc, 314 F.Supp.3d at 109.
147. See generally, R. DOAK BISHOP, JAMES CRAWFORD, & W. MICHAEL REISMAN,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY (2014) (explaining
the history of gunboat diplomacy in Chapter 1).
148. Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India) Inc, 314 F.Supp.3d at 109.

